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Abstract We investigate conditions in which more accurate
metacognition may lead to greater susceptibility to illusion
and thus conditions under which mindfulness meditation
may lead to less accurate perceptions. Specifically, greater
awareness of intentions may lead to an illusory compression
of time between a voluntary action and its outcome
(Bintentional binding^). Here, we report that experienced
Buddhist mindfulness meditators rather than non-meditators
display a greater illusory shift of the timing of an outcome
toward an intentional action. Mindfulness meditation involves
awareness of causal connections between different mental
states, including intentions. We argue that this supports im-
provements in metacognition targeted at motor intentions.
Changes in metacognitive ability may result in an earlier and
less veridical experience of the timing of action outcomes
either through increased access to sensorimotor pre-
representations of an action outcome or by affording greater
precision to action timing judgements. Furthermore, as inten-
tional binding is an implicit measure of the sense of agency;
these results also provide evidence that mindfulness medita-
tors experience a stronger sense of agency.
Keywords Mindfulness . Intentions . Sense of agency . Time
perception . Causal binding . Intentional binding
Introduction
Mindfulness is a concept central to Buddhist traditions and
can be defined as the cultivation of a calm (hence Bnon-
judgemental^) awareness of present states, especially mental
states, and specifically including an awareness of the temporal
properties of the ongoing states, such as their transience
(Williams and Kabat-Zinn 2011). While mindfulness practice
often starts with awareness of the experiences of breathing, the
central mindfulness practice of the Pali canon, Satipatthana,
includes cultivating awareness of all mental states, including
intentions and their consequences (Analayo 2004; Gunaratana
2012). Thus Dreyfus (2011) argued that mindfulness medita-
tion should lead to cognitive differences in the awareness of
intentions and urges psychologists to explore this possibility.
Consistently, mindfulness meditators have been found to re-
port earlier judgements of the timing of an intention to move
than non-meditators, suggesting they have more accurate
metacognition related to intention (Dienes et al. 2016; Lush
Naish and Dienes 2016).
The sense of agency can be defined as the sense of being in
control of one’s goal-directed actions and their outcomes in
the world (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008; Haggard and
Chambon 2012). The modern study of agency can be traced
back to the work of Libet GleasonWright and Pearl (1983), in
which the timing of a conscious intention to move (W) was
related to the Breadiness potential^ in the motor cortex which
precedes voluntary motor actions. Libet et al. measured timing
judgements by asking participants to watch a rotating Bclock^
and to retrospectively report the position of the clock Bhand^
had occupied when they experienced the urge to move.
Intentional binding refers to the subjectively reported time
compression that occurs between an intentional action and
its outcome when compared to the timing of an action alone
and of an event that does not depend upon an action (Haggard,
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Clark and Kalogeras 2002). It can be measured using Libet
et al.’s rotating clock method to record the judged time of an
action or an auditory tone in two conditions: a contingent
condition in which the action causes the tone; and a baseline
condition in which the action does not result in a tone or the
tone occurs without an action. The effect emerges from the
perceived shift of the action toward the tone (action binding)
and of the tone toward the action that caused it (outcome
binding) in the contingent condition compared to the baseline
condition (Moore and Obhi 2012).
Intentional binding has been employed to investigate dis-
orders that involve changes in the sense of agency e.g. in
schizophrenia (Haggard Martin Taylor-Clarke Jeannerod and
Franck 2003; Voss et al. 2010), alien limb syndrome (Wolpe
et al. 2013) and functional motor disorder (Kranick et al.
2013) and in pharmacologically induced changes in sense of
agency e.g. ketamine (Moore et al. 2011). There is, however,
some evidence that weaker action-effect interval binding can
occur in the absence of intention (Buehner 2012;
Wohlschlager Haggard Gesierich and Prinz 2003).
Therefore, intentional binding may be a special case of a more
general causal binding of actions to their outcomes, with in-
formation specific to intentions supporting stronger binding.
There is not yet consensus on the mechanism of intentional
binding. The important point is that the proposed mechanisms
agree on intentional binding arising from metacognitive pro-
cesses. Greater awareness of intentions should increase the
binding effect. According to one theory, outcome binding
arises from accurate prediction of action outcomes (Waszak,
Cardoso-Leite and Hughes 2012). That is, the better one can
predict the outcome from the intention, the sooner in time the
outcome is perceived as happening. On other theories, the
assessed time of each component is affected by a type of
anchoring produced by the other event happening. In this case,
the greater precision with which an intention and, hence, an
intentional action is timed, the more it will affect the perceived
time of the outcome (Kawabe Roseboom and Nishida 2013;
Moore and Fletcher 2012). With regard to intentional binding
being a measure of sense of agency, the more precisely one
represents the outcomes of an intention as intentional out-
comes, the more sense one has of acting on an intention; or
the more precision with which one represents the intention,
the more sense one has as acting on an intention. Thus, on
each of these theories, greater awareness of intentions should
lead to greater outcome binding, associated with a greater
sense of agency.
Because Buddhist mindfulness involves awareness of
Bdependent origination^ i.e. the causal connections between dif-
ferent mental states, including intentions and their outcomes (for
example, in mindfulness of movements, Gunaratama 2012),
meditators should have greater metacognitive access to their in-
tentions. Meditation is an exercise in metacognitive processes,
both in monitoring and control (Jankowski and Holas 2014) and
sustained meditation practice seems likely to lead to changes in
metacognition (Dienes et al. 2016). Consistently, meditators have
been found to show more accurate metacognition related to the
timing of an intention than non-meditators, (Lush Naish and
Dienes 2016) and experienced meditators have been shown to
have greater metacognitive access to negative deflections of slow
cortical potentials (which, when averaged, produce the early
readiness potential) (Jo Hinterberger Wittmann and Schmidt
2015).
Greater metacognitive accuracy of higher order mental
states targeted at motor intentions should influence timing
judgements that are dependent on prediction, such as outcome
binding. These considerations can be used to make different
predictions. On the one hand, meditators may be more accu-
rate in their timing estimates due to improvements in meta-
cognition and attention resulting from mindfulness practice
(Jo et al. 2014). On the other hand, the ability to develop
accurate prior expectations concerning the outcome of inten-
tions, and to consistently and reliably use those expectations,
could lead to perception of the tone as occurring early. In
terms of this mechanism, this could result either from more
reliable sensorimotor pre-representations of the outcome tone
(Waszak et al. 2012) or through greater precision (and there-
fore greater weight) being afforded to intentional action in an
outcome timing judgement (Wolpe et al. 2013). As there is
some agreement that action binding is a result of cue integra-
tion, action binding would be smaller in meditators if there is a
relative increase in precision of action judgements, reducing
the relative contribution of the tone to action timing judge-
ments (Wolpe and Rowe 2014).
Jo et al. (2014), the one previous study that has addressed
the question of intentional binding in meditators, found no
significant difference between meditators and non-meditators
in intentional binding. However, a non-significant result does
not in itself mean there is no effect. To assess the sensitivity of
the study to pick up an effect, an estimate is needed of the sort
of difference in intentional binding that could be found be-
tween different groups. Kranick et al. (2013) provided such an
estimate using functional motor disorder patients; the differ-
ence between groups was on the order of magnitude of about
half the effect found in control participants. Based on this
estimate, Jo et al’s data do not provide evidence for there being
no difference in intentional binding between meditators and
non-meditators (see Supplemental materials).
We tested mindfulness meditators and age-matched con-
trols on an intentional binding task. If mindfulness increases
the relative precision afforded to action timing judgements,
then the meditation group should show decreased action bind-
ing and increased outcome binding due to improved
metacognitive access to motor intentions resulting from a his-
tory of sustained attention to intentions and actions.
Alternatively, if meditators are more accurate in their timing
estimates as a result of improved attentional abilities generally,
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their reported judgements should be more veridical and they
should show less binding of any sort (Jo Hinterberger and
Schmidt 2014).
Method
Participants
Eight meditators were recruited from Brighton-based Buddhist
organisations. Eight age and gender matched controls were
recruited by advertisement (3males and 5 females, mean age =
49.3 years, SD = 10.5). The Buddhist meditators (3 males and
5 females, mean age = 49.1 years, SD = 9.8) reported a mean
of 14.6 years of continuous meditation experience (SD = 11.6)
and a mean of 23.3 (SD = 12.0) hours per month meditation.
Meditators were asked to provide details of their practice in
simple terms and all reported using a form of mindfulness
meditation. All members of the control group reported that
they had no experience of mindfulness meditation.
Ethical approval was received from the University of
Sussex ethical committee. Informed consent was obtained
from each participant before commencing with the study.
Participants received cash payment of £5, and were addition-
ally paid £5 in travel expenses.
Participants were recruited for the duration of one term,
until there were no more responses. Bayesian analyses were
used to assess sensitivity. As stopping was not conditional on
the p value, orthodox statistics assuming fixed N could be
used (Cox and Mayo 2010, section 10.1). Crucially, we used
Bayesian analyses to indicate the strength of evidence for H1
versus H0; the measure of evidence is valid nomatter what the
stopping rule.
Procedure
Visual stimuli were displayed at 100 Hz on a 21-in. CRT
monitor and auditory stimuli were presented via Sennheiser
headphones. For each trial, a clock face was presented,
marked at thirty degree intervals and subtended a visual angle
of five degrees. A static dot, subtending at 0.2°, appeared at a
pseudo-randomised position and began rotating around the
clock 250 ms later (at 2560 ms per revolution). Participants
were seated at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. A
computer keyboard was used to record actions (button
presses).
There were four trial types, presented in separate blocks. In
contingent trials, pressing a key triggered a 1000 Hz, 100 ms
duration tone after a 250 ms delay. Participants were asked to
look at a fixation cross in the centre of the clock and to wait for
at least one revolution before pressing the button at a time of
their choosing. The trial was restarted if the action occurred
before one full revolution or after six revolutions. Participants
were asked not to plan ahead or to aim for a particular point on
the clock and to report either the action or the tone (to give
contingent action or contingent tone judgements). Baseline
action trials were the same as contingent action trials except
the button did not trigger a tone. In baseline tone trials, the
tone was triggered pseudo-randomly between 2.5 s and 7 s
following one revolution of the clock.
Following the tone (or action on baseline action trials), the
dot continued moving for a pseudo-randomised period of time
between 1200 ms and 2370 ms. The clock was then removed
from the screen for a pseudorandomised time interval (500 ms
to 1280 ms). When the clock reappeared, participants were
able to control the position of the dot with a mouse. Moving
the mouse forward (toward the screen) caused the dot to move
in a clockwise direction around the clock face and the reverse
mouse movement (away from the screen) caused the dot to
move counter-clockwise around the clock face. Participants
were asked to move the dot to the position it had occupied at
the time of the judged event (action or tone) and to press the
mouse button to record their judgement.
Each block consisted of 40 repetitions of one trial type
and blocks were separated by 30 s rest periods. The four
blocks were presented in counterbalanced order. Before
the session began, all participants were trained with four
practice trials in the baseline tone condition and four in
the baseline action condition so that they could become
familiarised with the reporting procedure. All Stimuli
were generated with Matlab running Psychtoolbox v3
(Kleiner et al. 2007).
Measures
Mean judgement errors were calculated for each group on
each trial type. Individual judgements more than 3.5 SD from
the mean for each participant on each judgement type were
excluded before mean judgement errors were calculated for
each participant. Nine judgements were filtered by this meth-
od ((1.4 % of all trials). The adjusted mean errors for action
and tone conditions were then subtracted from their respective
contingent conditions to calculate action and outcome bind-
ing. Finally, outcome binding was subtracted from action
binding to produce a total binding measure. We ran indepen-
dent t tests to compare the two groups on these measures.
Within-participant SD of timing judgements provides a
measure of precision in estimating the time of an event. If
binding reflects the combination of cues according to the pre-
cision afforded to actions or their outcomes, any differences in
intentional binding should be accompanied by differences in
this measure. In terms of cue integration theory, it is the inter-
action between meditators vs controls by tone vs action timing
precision that determines changes in intentional binding be-
tween groups. If meditators relative to controls have greater
precision for actions rather than outcomes, then outcome
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binding should be greater and action binding less for medita-
tors relative to controls.
Data Analyses
Bayes factors (B) were used to assess strength of evidence
(Wagenmakers Verhagen Ly Matzke Steingroever Rouder
and Morey in press). Unlike null-hypothesis significance test-
ing, Bayes factors have the advantage of distinguishing sensi-
tive evidence for H0 from not much evidence at all. A B of
above 3 indicates substantial evidence for the alternative hy-
pothesis and below 1/3 substantial evidence for the null hy-
pothesis. Bs between 3 and 1/3 indicate data insensitivity in
distinguishing null and alternative hypotheses (Dienes 2014;
Jeffreys 1939). Here, BH(0, x) refers to a Bayes factor in which
the predictions of H1 were modelled as half-normal distribu-
tion with an SD of x (Dienes 2014); the half-normal can be
used when a theory makes a directional prediction where x
scales the size of effect that could be expected (so x can be
chosen from e.g. relevant past studies). Kranick et al. (2013)
provide an estimate of the sort of difference in intentional
binding that could be found between different groups using
conversion disorder patients; the difference between groups in
tone binding was on the order of magnitude of about half the
effect found in control participants. Bayes factors for group
differences in each measure were therefore calculated using a
half-normal distribution with SD based on half the total shift
in the control group. The direction we used is that predicted by
cue combination and sensorimotor pre-representation theories
of intentional binding, given the assumptions discussed in the
introduction (Wolpe and Rowe 2014). That is, the prediction
was a greater outcome binding for meditators rather than con-
trols, but a reduced action binding.
Bayes factors for solo action judgement group contrasts
were calculated using a full-normal with SD = 80 ms based
on the difference between meditators and non-meditators in
the timing of an intention to move (Lush Naish and Dienes
2016). H1 for analysing differences between meditators and
controls in standard deviations (SD) was specified using a
uniform from 0 to the control groups’ SD, specified as
BU[0,m] where m is the maximum of the uniform distribution.
A Bayes factor for the interaction of group and within-
participant SD in baseline action and outcome trials was cal-
culated using a uniform from 0 to the largest simple effect
difference between groups (Dienes 2014).
Results
Figure 1 shows the overall intentional binding measures for
each group. Meditators’ total binding (M = 168.8, SD = 98.9)
was greater than that of age-matched non meditators (M =
71.7 ms, SD = 62.6), t(14) = 2.34, p = 0.034, d = 1.17, BH(0,
40)= 3.95.
Figure 2 shows the action and outcome binding measures
for each group. Meditators’ outcome binding (M = -
138.02 ms, SD = 64.8) was greater than that of non-
meditators (M = -60.5 ms, SD = 50.0), t(14) = 2.68, p =
0.018, d = 1.34, BH(0, 32)= 6.57. There was no sensitive evi-
dence for whether or not meditators’ action binding (M =
30.7 ms, SD = 45.9) was less than that of non-meditators
(M = 13.9 ms, SD = 31.0), t(13) = 0.857, p = 0.406, d = 0.43,
BH(0, 9)= 0.80. For the prediction of action binding being great-
er for meditators rather than non-meditators, BH(0, 9) = 1.20.
The raw simple effect of meditators’ within-participant
SDs was 30.3 ms lower than that of controls for baseline
action judgements and 11.2 ms lower for baseline tone judge-
ments, so the raw interaction effect for within-participant SD
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on each measure between groups was 19.1 ms. There was no
evidence one way or the other for whether or not there was an
interaction, F(1, 14) = 0.427, p = 0.524, BU[0, 30] = 1.18.
Discussion
We found that meditators showed greater subjective compres-
sion of the interval between an intentional action and its out-
come than non-meditators (intentional binding). Specifically,
meditators showed a greater shift in the perceived timing of an
event toward the action that caused it; there was no sensitive
evidence for a difference between meditators and non-
meditators in the shift of action judgements toward its tone
(Bayesian analysis showed these data to be insensitive in dis-
criminating H1 fromH0, so no firm conclusions can be drawn
with regard to accepting the null hypothesis for action binding
difference and this non-significant result will not discussed
further). Meditators therefore reported a less veridical experi-
ence of timing of action outcomes than non-meditators.
Furthermore, as intentional binding is considered an implicit
measure of sense of agency, this result can be taken to show
that meditators have a stronger sense of agency than non-
meditators.
There may be different mechanisms underlying the two
binding components, action binding and outcome binding
(Wolpe Haggard Siebner and Rowe 2013). According to a
predictive, sensorimotor model of outcome binding, the effect
is due to a decreased latency in the perception of an outcome
that results from the pre-representation of the predicted out-
come of an action (Waszak et al. 2012). Therefore, an increase
in outcome bindingmay be driven by stronger or more reliable
predictive sensorimotor representations of the tone (Synofzik,
Vosgerau and Voss 2013). Alternatively, when an outcome
event is contingent upon an action event, the judgement of
the time at which a particular event occurs may be a weighted
average of each cue (Kawabe et al. 2013; Moore and Fletcher
2012). In this case, group differences in the timing shift of an
outcome toward an action or of an action toward an outcome
would reflect group differences in the relative weighting of
each cue (on cue integration theory, we should expect lower
variance of within-participant SD of action judgements than
tone judgements; however, the evidence here was insensitive,
so we can draw no conclusion as to how our results relate to
this theory).
The increased outcome binding in meditators we report
here could be attributable to differences in metacognition of
motor intentions under both these accounts. Meditators may
have more reliable or well specified sensorimotor representa-
tions of the predicted outcomes of an action, consistent with
the claim that mindfulness involves close attention to concrete
experience (Watkins 2015). Alternatively, on a cue combina-
tion approach meditators would show stronger outcome
binding if improved metacognitive access to motor intentions
or actions relative to external stimuli (like tones) affords
higher precision of action timing relative to outcome timing.
In this case, an increase in the weighting of the action cue in
outcome judgements would lead to the timing judgement be-
ing drawn closer to the time of the action and therefore more
outcome binding. In either case, greater accuracy of higher
order mental states directed at intentions and their associated
actions would, somewhat paradoxically, lead to a less veridi-
cal subjective experience of the timing of an intentional ac-
tion’s outcome. The direct test of differences in precisions
between groups for actions relative tones was insensitive, so
this explanation is neither directly supported nor ruled out by
the data.
Consistent with the suggestion that outcome binding is
increased by improved metacognition of motor intentions,
there is growing evidence that outcome binding is reduced
when the contribution of intentions is reduced. A reduction
in outcome binding has been shown to occur when partici-
pants incorrectly believed their action did not cause an out-
come, a finding which may be attributable to the discounting
motor intention related cues in judging the time of an outcome
(Desantis Roussel and Waszak 2011). A post-hypnotically
suggested experience of involuntariness has also been shown
to reduce outcome binding (Lush et al., submitted). This find-
ing may also be a result of the reduced contribution of motor
intentions to the outcome judgement, as hypnotically induced
experiences of involuntariness may be supported by the avoid-
ance ofmotor intentions in formingmetacognitive judgements
of agency (Dienes 2012). Finally, activity in the pre-
supplementary motor area (preSMA) reflects motor intentions
(Lau Rogers Haggard and Passingham 2004). The disruption
of activity in the preSMA by repetitive trans-cranial magnetic
stimulation (rTMS) has been found to lead to a reduction in
outcome binding (Moore et al. 2010) and the amplitude of the
early readiness potential in the preSMA (associated with mo-
tor preparation) has been found to positively correlate with
outcome binding (Jo et al. 2014).
Jo et al. (2014) reported a non-significant difference in
intentional binding between mindfulness meditators and
age-matched controls. However, Bayes factors can be
employed to test evidence for the null hypothesis
(Dienes 2014; Wagenmakers et al. in press; Dienes
2016), and in fact a meta-analysis of the results of the
two studies provides sensitive evidence for an increase
in ove r a l l b ind ing and ou t come b ind ing ( s ee
Supplementary materials).
Mindfulness meditators report a slower subjective passing
of time and are thought to experience an Bextended now^
(Wittmann and Schmidt 2014). However, here we report a
shorter estimate of the time interval between an action and
its outcome in meditators. These results can be taken to sug-
gest that meditators have a stronger implicit, experiential
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sense of agency than non-meditators (Ryan and Rigby 2015).
The study of group differences in action-outcome binding
may therefore inform our understanding of the sense of agen-
cy and consequently disorders which involve distortions in the
sense of agency, (e.g., functional motor disorders or schizo-
phrenia). To this end, mindfulness meditators offer clear ad-
vantages over the use of the pharmacological interventions or
clinical populations in which previous group differences in
action-outcome binding have been observed. For example,
the role of predictive cues in intentional binding has previous-
ly been studied by varying the probability of an outcome tone
occurring (Moore and Haggard 2008). This method has been
used to investigate intentional binding in schizophrenia and
could be straightforwardly applied to investigate predictive
contributions to outcome binding in meditators (Voss et al.
2010).
We report increased intentional binding, an objective mea-
sure of the sense of agency, in meditators over age-matched
controls. Specifically, meditators showed a larger shift in the
timing of an outcome toward the intentional action that caused
it. While meditators here reported a less veridical experience
of the timing of an event, we argue that this reflects that com-
pared to non-meditators, mindfulness meditators have im-
proved metacognition of motor intentions.
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